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Abstract
Background: To improve the performance of the healthcare system, Mali’s government implemented a pilot project of 
performance-based financing (PBF) in the field of reproductive health. It was established in the Koulikoro region. This 
research analyses the process of implementing PBF at district hospital (DH) level, something which has rarely been done 
in Africa.
Methods: This qualitative research is based on a multiple, explanatory, and contrasting case study with nested levels of 
analysis. It covered three of the 10 DHs in the Koulikoro region. We conducted 36 interviews: 12 per DH with council of 
circle’s members (2) and health personnel (10). We also conducted 24 non-participant observation sessions, 16 informal 
interviews, and performed a literature review. We performed data analysis using the Consolidated Framework for 
Implementation Research (CFIR).
Results: Stakeholders perceived the PBF pilot project as a vertical intervention from outside that focused solely on 
reproductive health. Local actors were not involved in the design of the PBF model. Several difficulties regarding the 
quality of its design and implementation were highlighted: too short duration of the intervention (8 months), choice 
and insufficient number of indicators according to the priority of the donors, and impossibility of making changes 
to the model during its implementation. All health workers adhered to the principles of PBF intervention. Except for 
members of the district health management team (DHMT) involved in the implementation, respondents only had partial 
knowledge of the PBF intervention. The implementation of PBF appeared to be easier in District 3 Hospital compared to 
District 1 and District 2 because it benefited from a pre-pilot project and had good leadership.
Conclusion: The PBF programme offered an opportunity to improve the quality of care provided to the population 
through the motivation of health personnel in Mali. However, several obstacles were observed during the implementation 
of the PBF pilot project in DHs. When designing and implementing PBF in DHs, it is necessary to consider factors that 
can influence the implementation of a complex intervention.
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Implications for policy makers
• Involving decentralised actors in the process of choosing performance-based financing (PBF) indicators is essential for its success because it 
allows for better ownership of the intervention at the local level. 
• Factors that may influence the leadership and management capacity of district hospitals (DHs) need to be taken into account at the start of PBF 
as this supports its implementation.
• The limited number of indicators paid by PBF in DHs can have negative effects on its implementation, as it may reduce the involvement of all 
health workers in achieving results.
Implications for the public
The main objective of performance-based financing (PBF) is to improve the quality of care provided to the population through the motivation of 
health workers. Our study on the implementation of PBF in district hospitals (DHs) in Mali illustrates that the leadership capacity of the first DH 
manager is a factor that influences the implementation and the ownership of PBF in DHs. In addition to the contextual factors, our study identified 
some effects of PBF implementation in Mali. Our study showed that the establishment of new support tools (attendance book, register, feedback 
sheets in the evacuation-reference system) made it possible to strengthen the health system. 
Key Messages 
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Background 
Performance-based financing (PBF) is a mechanism by which 
health facilities are paid on the basis of their performance, 
which is measured by the quantity and quality of services 
they provide.1 This practice would increase the productivity 
and quality of healthcare benefits available to people.2,3 PBF 
is expanding rapidly in low- and middle-income countries,4 
and gaining interest from governments and development 
agencies.5,6 However, the results of several systematic reviews 
are mixed with respect to the effects of PBF on the use 
and the quality of health services.7-10 Studies point to a gap 
between expectations and achievements in the experimenting 
PBF.11-14 In Benin, Antony et al14 emphasised the complexity 
and high cost of qualitative, quantitative, and community 
verification processes. In Nigeria, Ogundeji et al12 showed 
that the delay and lack of communication in the payment of 
PBF financial rewards have led to uncertainty and mistrust 
among health workers about PBF, causing a negative impact 
on health workers motivation. In Cameroon, a study by De 
Allegri et al15 revealed that the delay due to the payment of 
PBF bonus payments did not allow the health centre to have 
effective management autonomy, to execute their plans, and 
to cover the costs of taking care of the very poor. The majority 
of articles on the implementation of the PBF in Africa11,12,16 
either featured a wide range of health facilities (dispensaries, 
health posts, health centres, and hospitals) or just focused on 
primary health centres. 
Thus, the particular context prevailing in district hospitals 
(DHs) is not prominently or systematically featured in articles 
studying the implementation of PBF in Africa. In Malawi, 
Lohmann et al16 showed that in community-level health 
facilities, individual financial incentives were distributed to 
all staff at the centre, while in the DHs, priority was given 
to health workers working in maternity wards. In Rwanda, 
Paul’s study17 explained that distribution of bonus payments 
between health workers in DHs was not done on the basis 
of individual performance evaluations, but rather on the 
performance of health units or hospitals. In addition, this case 
study in Rwanda demonstrated that the performance of health 
workers in DHs was dependent on several factors related to 
the work environment (equipment availability, leadership, 
and communication), and health workers’ characteristics 
(norms and values in relation to work). Clearly, a problem 
of transparency and lack of information arose during the 
implementation of PBF, which in some cases impacted the 
motivation of DH health workers. In Burundi, a qualitative 
DH level study highlighted that stakeholders’ views and the 
context of implementation need to be taken into account 
from the design and during the implementation of the PBF.18 
In Burkina Faso, a study from Bodson et al19 showed that 
PBF was more faithfully implemented at the level of primary 
health centres compared to hospitals. However, this study 
did not concern the analysis of the contextual factors that 
could explain these results. Our article aims to fill a research 
gap in the existing literature, by analysing the process of 
implementation of PBF at the DH level of Koulikoro region 
in Mali. The following research question guides this study: 
how is PBF implemented in DHs? We aim to understand the 
problems related to the design of the PBF intervention model 
and the influence of the local context; and to highlight the 
specific local norms and values guiding the implementation 
of PBF at the DH level.
History of Performance-Based Financing in Mali 
From February 2012 to December 2013, a pre-pilot PBF 
project was initiated in the Koulikoro region, specifically in 
the districts of Dioïla, Fana, and Banamba. The project was 
implemented following a partnership between the Ministry 
of Health and Public Hygiene (Ministère de la Santé et de 
l’Hygiène Publique [MSHP]), the Netherlands Development 
Organization (SNV), and the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT). 
An evaluation of the project was carried out in May 2014 by 
consultants directly involved in designing and implementing 
the intervention.20 In their report, the authors claimed to 
identify an increase in the use of health facilities for certain 
services concerning maternal health and an improvement in 
the quality of care. However, an independent study showed 
that the introduction and removal of PBF had no effect on 
the use of maternal and child health services.21 In addition, 
another study showed that the degree of sustainability for this 
intervention was weak.22 
Subsequently, Mali’s government, as part of a large World 
Bank-funded Strengthening Reproductive Health Project 
(SRHP), expanded the PBF initiative to all ten health districts 
from the Koulikoro region.23 SRHP was intended to support 
Mali’s efforts to strengthen its health system in a number of 
ways: (i) strengthening the supply and quality of reproductive 
health services; (ii) increasing demand for reproductive health 
services; and (iii) social responsibility, project management, 
and monitoring and evaluation.24 The PBF pilot project is one 
of the sub-components of SRHP. According to its designers, 
the goal of the PBF strategy is to increase the use of quality 
reproductive health services by increasing the motivation 
and accountability of service providers to achieve results. 
PBF involved a total of 205 Community Health Centres 
(Centres de santé communautaires [CSCom]) and 10 DHs. 
Implementation of the PBF component of the SRHP started 
in July 2016 for a period of 8 months.24 
Architecture of the Performance-Based Financing Pilot in 
Mali 
The actors who implemented the PBF pilot project decided 
that it embraces the architecture of the health system 
without introducing new structures. At the central level, an 
interministerial steering committee was set up to monitor the 
implementation of the SRHP. The SRHP was coordinated by the 
Project Coordination Unit, with which the MSHP had signed 
a contract. A contract was also signed between the Project 
Coordination Unit and a multi-stakeholder consortium. The 
consortium, which included 2 Dutch organisations (KIT 
and Cordaid) and a local company (Clinique de Gestion 
et d’Innovation des Connaissances [CGIC]), was tasked 
with project operationalisation. The consortium acted as a 
contracting and verification agency. To assist local actors in 
the implementation of PBF, 10 technical assistant experts in 
PBF were recruited and assigned to each DH level. Five of 
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these technical assistant experts were international experts 
from other African countries, and 5 were Mali nationals. 
At the local level, a PBF contract was signed between the 
KIT-Cordaid-CGIC Consortium and the circle council (ie, 
the administrative body responsible for managing the circles) 
overseeing the DHs. Circles are sub-district administrations 
that gather several municipalities, endowed with a legal 
personality and benefiting from financial autonomy. 
Subsequently, circle councils signed a contract with DHs 
for the implementation of PBF. DHs developed results plans 
quarterly, which identified the main barriers to improving 
health indicators in geographic areas. It suggested solutions 
to solve health system and healthcare issues, and the means 
to implement those solutions. The development of the results 
plans also involved health workers and the participation of 
members from the circle council. As a regulator, the role of the 
Regional Health Directorate (Direction régionale de la santé 
[DRS]) was to ensure the respect of quality standards in DHs. 
Three quantitative indicators were chosen for PBF in DHs 
(Table S1, Supplementary file 1). Amounts for indicators paid 
under PBF were decided before beginning implementation. 
DRS members checked DH records monthly to verify the total 
number of services offered. Quality indicators were checked 
quarterly by members of the DRS. Verification of qualitative 
indicators resulted in the attribution of a technical quality 
score are expressed as a percentage (Table S2, Supplementary 
file 1). In DHs, a maximum of 60% of the PBF subsidies were 
planned to reward individual motivation of health workers, 
and a minimum of 40% was to be spent on equipment. Once 
quantitative and qualitative indicators had been checked, the 
PBF subsidies were channelled into bank accounts of DHs. 
Counter-verification of user performance was done by local 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Methods
Setting of the Study 
The study took place in Mali, in the Koulikoro region. In this 
country, the health system pyramid has 3 levels (Figure S1, 
Supplementary file 1). Table S3 outlines socio-demographic 
and health characteristics of Mali and the Koulikoro region. 
Conceptual Framework 
Data collection and process analysis were carried out using 
the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research 
(CFIR).25 According to this framework, 5 dimensions should 
be studied to understand the implementation of a health 
intervention (Figure): (i) Characteristics of PBF intervention, 
(ii) Outer Setting to DH, (iii) Inner Setting to DH, (iv) 
Characteristics of Individuals, and (v) Process (of PBF). Each 
of these dimensions includes several constructs. Thanks to a 
preliminary analysis of the CFIR conceptual framework by the 
research team, we were able to classify the selected constructs 
and their descriptions as well as the constructs not retained 
and their justification (see Table S4, Supplementary file 1). 
Research Strategy 
We adopted a qualitative approach, based on a set of 
explanatory and contrasting multiple case studies with nested 
levels of analysis26 corresponding to DHs and participants 
to the implementation of PBF. The conceptual framework 
outlined above (CFIR) guides our case studies. As per 
Yin’s 5 components of a case study, our study used: (1) a 
research question: how is PBF implemented in DHs?; (2) 
one main proposition in relation to the research question: 
the characteristics of the PBF intervention, the outer and 
inner setting of DHs, the characteristics of individuals, 
and the processes embedded in the intervention affect the 
implementation of PBF; (3) units of analysis (detailed in 
the paragraph below); (4) logic linking of the data to the 
propositions; and (5) the following criteria for interpreting 
the findings: CFIR’s 5 dimensions (ie, characteristics of the 
PBF intervention, outer setting of DH, inner setting of DH, 
characteristics of individuals, and PBF process) guiding data 
collection (eg, interview guides) and analytical approach. 
We chose 3 of the 10 DHs in the Koulikoro region. The 
characteristics of the 3 health districts and their DH are 
summarised in Table S5, Supplementary file 1. These figures 
take into account our resource constraints, but also feature 
an adequate representation of the diversity of contextual 
situations conducive to the analytical generalisation process 
specific to case.26 Our study is part of a wider research 
programme entitled: “Results-based financing for equitable 
access to maternal and child health care in Mali and Burkina 
Faso.” The cases were those identified for this research 
programme. 
Several districts were removed from the eligible cases 
because they did not represent the regular context of the 
health system that the intervention aims to improve (strong 
interventions by several NGOs), or are not accessible for 
security reasons. District 1 was selected for its urban character 
and the presence of a medical assistance scheme (Régime 
d’assistance médicale [RAMED]). In Mali, RAMED provides 
medical care for the poor and other vulnerable populations. 
District 2 was chosen for featuring an articulation of PBF 
with a community-based insurance was envisaged. This was 
intended to assess the extent to which PBF could serve as a 
basis for the accreditation process of health facilities, a process 
that predates the development of social protection systems 
Figure. Conceptual Framework, Adapted From Damschroder et al.25
Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
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(compulsory health insurance, community-based insurance, 
and RAMED). Finally, we selected District 3, a landlocked 
and agricultural area in which a community experiment to 
identify the poorest was also tested. Of the 3 districts selected, 
only District 3 experienced the PBF pilot phase.
Sampling of Participants 
Purposeful sampling was used to select participants, so as 
to ensure external diversification. This selection makes it 
possible to contrast the different points of view of actors who 
occupy different positions within a group, in order to have 
an overall analysis that can be generalised.27 For each district, 
it was necessary to identify the different categories of actors 
involved in the implementation of PBF at the level of the 3 
DHs. Different stakeholder profiles (Table 1) were selected to 
compare points of view.27 Participants were recruited based 
on their availability to answer interview questions.
Tools, Techniques, and Data Collection 
The research was conducted from December 2016 to January 
2017. We stayed for 12 days in each of the 3 DHs. Actors’ 
perceptions and practices was the centre of the interview 
questions. Three semi-structured interview guides were 
prepared for the District Health Manager (Médecin chef de 
District [MCD]), staff (medical doctors, nurses, and other 
health workers and staff), and circle council members. The 
contents of the 3 guides have been adapted with the selected 
CFIR constructs. 
We conducted 36 semi-structured interviews. We also 
conducted 24 non-participant observation sessions as well 
as 16 informal interviews with 2 caretakers, 5 physicians, 1 
pharmacist, 1 health information officer, 1 social development 
officer, 2 nurses, 2 interns, 1 midwife, 1 nurse woman, and 
1 hygienist. Personal notes taken during non-participant 
observations and informal interviews were recorded in a 
journal. In the non-participant observation sessions, we 
focused on the following topics: (i) work environment 
(hygiene in hospital outbuildings, treatment rooms, waiting 
areas, washrooms, etc); (ii) technical tools in DHs (ie, 
availability and filling of clinical records, attendance books); 
and (iii) work performance (ie, quality of reception, quality of 
orientation, guard system).
Data Processing and Analysis
Data processing was done iteratively. All interviews and 
notes written were classified by site. Research assistants 
transcribed verbatim all the recordings. The transcribed data 
was reviewed and coded using a codebook derived from our 
theoretical framework.28 We coded the data using the QDA 
Miner Lite software. Based on these codes, we conducted 
data analysis using the CFIR. This method allowed for an 
analytical approach that followed a deductive-inductive 
logic, based on the CFIR dimensions, and allowed empirical 
themes to emerge that may be relevant to better understand 
the implementation of PBF in Mali. Our results are presented 
using the 5 dimensions of the CFIR framework, following 
a comprehensive and logical flow as recommended by a 
conceptor of the CFIR.25
Results 
Our results feature a general analysis of the implementation 
of PBF in DHs in Mali. Very few empirical differences 
appeared between the cases: only significant differences were 
highlighted. In this section, the themes match the dimension 
of the CFIR. CFIR sub-constructs are shown in brackets.
Characteristics of the Performance-Based Financing Intervention 
The majority of the actors were not aware of the source of 
financing for the PBF pilot intervention (Intervention Source): 
 ‘‘I think maybe it’s the partners (who brought in PBF), but 
I have no idea. I have not received any information about 
that’’ [Nurse, Case 2]. 
Only respondents among district health management team 
(DHMT) members involved in the implementation knew that 
the World Bank funded the PBF intervention. Respondents 
believed that PBF provided a better return on investment as 
compared to another existing project (Relative Advantage). 
However, they perceived the project as being too short (8 
months) because it only allowed for one payment cycle in a 
single quarter: 
“The duration of the implementation is a factor of 
discouragement, because the change of system requires a 
[comprehensive] support system; it is not in 8 months that 
it can do it, especially where there’s staff turnover” [Agent in 
charge of hygiene/sanitation, Case 3]. 
Furthermore, respondents perceived PBF as a vertical 
Table 1. People Surveyed at the Level of the 3 DHs
People Surveyed DH 1 DH 2 DH 3 Total
Circle council members 2 2 2 6
District health managers 1 1 1 3
Medical doctors 1 1 1 3
PBF focal points 1 1 1 3
Agents in charge of health information systems 1 1 1 3
Nurses 2 2 2 6
Obstetrician nurses 2 2 2 6
Pharmacist/drug’s managers 1 1 1 3
Agent in charge of hygiene/sanitation 1 1 1 3
Total 12 12 12 36
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; DH, district hospital.
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program, ie, only focusing on reproductive health and not 
allowing involvement of all DH care services (Complexity). 
Moreover, they considered that choosing 3 quantitative 
indicators was insufficient (Design, Quality, and Packaging): 
“When you look at the documents that talk about PBF 
internationally, you are told that for a district hospital [DH] 
it takes for example twelve quantity indicators, we are at 
three” [District Health Manager, Case 3].
Several actors perceived this PBF intervention as a 
very complex system, ie, the multitude of procedures and 
approaches made its implementation at the local level very 
slow (Complexity). In addition, it was not possible to adapt 
the intervention as deficiencies were observed (Adaptability). 
PBF was an original action for the majority of DH 1 and 2 
staff, but not for DH 3 staff who had already experienced it 
(Trialability). Information on the implementation interest and 
effectiveness of the pre-pilot PBF project was provided during 
PBF training. Almost all respondents believed that PBF had 
already been proven during the pre-pilot phase. They believed 
that the pre-pilot project had resulted in individual benefits 
and improved both indicators and the quality of care provided 
(Evidence Strength and Quality): 
“The people who participated in the PBF pre-pilot project 
say that it brought them money. In addition it allowed them 
to supply their structure” [Medical Doctor, Case 1].
Outer Setting to Health Facilities 
The PBF reform is featured in the Decennial Health and 
Social Development Programme III (Programme Décennal 
de Développement Sanitaire et Social) period 2014-2023 as an 
innovative approach that can improve the healthcare quality 
(External Policy and Incentives). Informants reported that 
indicators selected matched donors’ priorities. Local actors 
were not involved in the design process (choice indicators, 
etc) of PBF. Yet, informants considered that quantitative 
indicators of PBF chosen at the DH level concerned maternal 
mortality issues of national priority. In addition, several 
actors argued that some relevant indicators such as curative 
consultation, fourth prenatal consultation, family planning, 
and the third post-natal consultation should have been taken 
into account (Patient Needs and Resources). To facilitate the 
implementation of PBF, DHs collaborated with external 
organisations like circle councils, the implementing agency 
(ie, the consortium including the technical assistant experts 
in PBF), and CSCom (Cosmopolitanism).
Inner Setting to Health Facilities 
The availability of local qualified personnel and equipment 
were factors that reportedly facilitated the implementation of 
PBF (Structural Characteristics). However, several problems 
experienced in DHs prevented adequate implementation of 
PBF (Table 2), such as malfunctioning management bodies 
(ie, management board and DHMTs) or staff mobilisation for 
meetings. Communication channels and tools were defective 
in the vast majority of DHs (Networks and Communications). 
In addition, we noted a problem of motivation for health 
workers: they did not have a performance culture in their 
work (Culture). PBF was implemented in a difficult context 
prevailing in DHs (Implementation Climate/Tension for 
Change).
Before the start of PBF implementation, all MCDs 
participated in a 2-week training in Benin in May 2016. 
A PBF focal point, (ie, a person assisting some MCD with 
PBF implementation), was appointed in each structure by 
the MCD. The decision to appoint a PBF focal point was 
entirely at the discretion of each MCD. The MCD and the 
Table 2. Summary of the Inner Setting That Prevailed Before the Implementation of PBF 
Dimensions Problems Experienced
Care delivery
 – Deficit of the technical platform
 – Staff instability
 – Non-compliance with standards and procedures
 – Inadequate retraining of health workers
Management-body (management board and 
DHMT) 
 – Malfunction of management bodies
 – Only MCD and managers were involved in financial management
 – Non-transparent management
 – Trust between staff and managers
Leadership of the MCD
 – Lack of leadership capacity in DH 1
 – Authoritarian leadership capacity in DH 2
 – Good leadership capacity in DH 3
Hygiene and sanitation
 – Presence of a sanitation hygiene unit
 – The hygiene of the premises and the courtyard was better in DH 2 and 3 than in DH 1
Patient reception and orientation
 – The reception of patients and their orientation was well done, and the name of each unit was placed 
on the buildings in French and local language (Bambara) in DH 3
 – In DH 1 and 2, there was a serious problem with patient referral, as care units were not identified
Guard system
 – A 7-day/7-day, 24-hour on-call system existed in all three DHs
 – In DH 1 a premium was paid to the DH guard, unlike in DH 2 and 3
Drug supply system for the health district  – Well-functioning
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; DH, district hospital; MCD, District Health Manager (Médecin chef de District); DHMT, district health 
management team.
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PBF Focal Point also participated in several other trainings 
at national and regional levels (Readiness for Implementation/
Access to Knowledge and Information). Two training sessions 
were conducted in each DH by the PBF focal point with the 
assistance of the technical assistant experts in PBF provided 
by the consortium. In addition to the 8 DH health workers, 
circle council members, journalists, chairs of Community 
Health Associations (Associations de santé communautaire), 
and Technical Directors of CSCom (Directeurs techniques 
de centres), participated in a 3-day PBF training session in 
each DH. The number of trainees and the duration of training 
was considered insufficient to understand the principles 
and functioning of the PBF project, given its complexity 
and the need to adapt it to each context. DHMT members 
were the most knowledgeable about the different contours 
of the intervention. There was no regular meeting to inform 
stakeholders on the implementation of PBF (Readiness for 
Implementation/Access to Knowledge and Information). 
According to the respondents, the development of the 
results plans started during training and was finalised by the 
human resources manager, the MCD, and the PBF focal point. 
In addition, except for those who participated in the training, 
health workers did not receive a document explaining PBF. 
Some health workers got information on PBF through those 
who participated. No poster or social marketing strategy for 
staff and users was used during PBF implementation:
“Users are not aware that there is a new system called PBF 
at the DH level” [PBF Focal Point, Case 1]. 
Although respondents did not mention measures to combat 
drug stockouts, PBF would have pushed DHs to better comply 
with the national drug supply plan. In addition, the vast 
majority of respondents did not believe that PBF brought 
anything new with respect to standards and procedures. 
Health workers did not perceive PBF as a new policy; 
rather they viewed it as a motivator to do their job better 
(Implementation Climate/Compatibility). In addition, the 
PBF implementing agency did not provide DHMT members 
with financial or logistical resources in time to enable for the 
performance of the indicator verification activities (Readiness 
for Implementation/ Available resources): 
“There are logistical problems in conducting supervision... 
we only have one vehicle [to do this]” [District Health 
Manager, Case 2]. 
Finally, the populations apparently were not informed 
about the implementation of PBF in DHs.
Characteristics of Individuals (Health Workers and Other 
Employees) 
The majority of respondents were supportive and enthusiastic 
about PBF principles (Knowledge and beliefs about the 
intervention of the PBF). According to them, PBF was different 
from other projects because it improved healthcare quality 
and patients’ satisfaction, by motivating health workers 
through individual incentives and investment subsidies 
for DHs. Although they linked PBF’s intervention to the 
values of a job well done. Some respondents mentioned the 
potential negative effects of PBF: (i) the lack of motivation 
of some members of the healthcare team; (ii) the competitive 
spirit leading to individualism and its negative consequences 
on teamwork; and (iii) the excessive increase in diagnostics 
related to PBF indicators. Respondents believed that there 
was a problem of ownership of PBF at the regional and 
national levels, which posed problems at the local level. 
According to them, the designed project did not allow for the 
involvement of all the actors who administered healthcare in 
DHs (Knowledge and beliefs about the intervention of the PBF). 
In Mali, the health sector is governed by procedures and 
standards that are regulated by the MSHP and its decentralised 
structures. This regulation is not always optimal due to a 
lack of resources (human, material, and financial). However, 
during the time of the interviews, the vast majority of health 
workers said they had become more motivated since the onset 
of PBF (Self-efficacy):
“Without PBF we are paid, and now with PBF we are even 
more motivated […]. So it becomes a double motivation, in 
addition to our salary, we will have a motivation of PBF” [PBF 
focal point, Case 1]. 
Some respondents complained that they gradually lost the 
motivation they had at the beginning because of the delays 
in evaluating the results and in bonus payments (Individual 
Stage of Change). Those involved in care services outside the 
maternity hospital did not feel committed to implementing 
PBF because the indicators chosen did not allow them to be 
involved (Individual Identification with Organisation).
Process for Implementing the Performance-Based Financing 
Intervention 
The pilot project of PBF, which included in the World Bank-
funded SRHP, was supposed to start in 2011. However, it 
did not start until 2016 and ended 8 months later, without 
any modification of the initial design (Executing). Its 
implementation was made hastily so as not to lose the funding 
obtained from the World Bank. During the implementation 
of PBF at local level, several problems emerged: limited 
knowledge, insufficient involvement of actors, poor local 
ownership, and a delay in the definition of the results plans 
and the signing of the contracts: 
 “It’s when time has ran out that you could at last do something 
quickly, and everything was rushed... and here we are, there’s a 
lot of problems” [District Health Manager, Case 1]. 
The development of the results plans faced multiple 
challenges in several DHs. In DH 3, the PBF contract was 
signed on time. While in DH 1 and 2, the lack of leadership 
from the lead manager (MCD) caused delays in contract 
signing (Planning). Once contracts were signed, MCD were 
expected to describe the tasks to be included in each agent’s 
engagement form. This sheet was supposed to allow each 
health worker to be informed of MCD expectations. This sheet 
allowed MCD to evaluate health workers (Planning). Once 
completed, individual engagement forms were distributed, 
but several agents had not yet signed them: 
“Here, our individual engagement contracts have not been 
signed (4 months after starting the PBF)” [Nurse, Case 2]. 
Health workers in DH 3 signed their individual engagement 
forms on time, and posted them in DH offices or rooms. DH 3 
had already implemented the forms because they had already 
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participated in a previous PBF pilot project (Planning). The 
appointment by the MCDs of a PBF focal point facilitated 
the implementation of PBF in DHs (Engaging/Formally 
Appointed Internal Implementation Leaders). In addition, 
the implementing agency provided 10 technical assistant 
experts in PBF (ie, 5 national and 5 international experts) 
for assisting with PBF implementation (Engaging/External 
Change Agents). However, respondents believed that resources 
(financial, material, and logistic) had not been sufficiently 
made available to these experts to fulfil their role: 
“He (PBF expert) did not receive any equipment, desk, 
seats, machine; and a vehicle had even been requested for 
supervision: nothing came” [PBF focal point, Case 2]. 
Under the PBF contract, the MCD supervised and 
evaluated the heads of each DH unit. Meanwhile, a team 
from the DRS evaluated the MCD. Subsequently, each DH 
head of unit supervised and evaluated the agents under their 
responsibility (Reflecting and Evaluating). No evaluation was 
done at the time of our visit to the DHs. For respondents, PBF 
improved health facilities supervision at the peripheral level. 
However, during implementation, frequent monitoring and 
evaluation required by PBF was not normally done (Reflecting 
and Evaluating). Despite the fact that qualified staff were 
trained to perform this task, informants considered the 
verification activities to be one of the most complicated tasks 
of the PBF project (10 days/month). In addition, according 
to some health workers, the fact that many of them were 
absent for 10 days a month for supervision would affect the 
quality of healthcare offered in DHs. Thus, the verification 
component of PBF was perceived as a potential disruptor of 
DHs functioning (Reflecting and Evaluating). New support 
tools (attendance book, register, and retro-information 
forms in the evacuation-reference system) were put in place 
for PBF implementation. They made it possible to improve 
case notification (eg, the systematic use of feedback sheets 
improved the evacuation reference system): 
“Before PBF, evacuation reference cases were recorded, 
but no feedback sheet was available. It was by phone that 
the Directeurs techniques de centres of the CSCom from 
which the patient came, was given the feedback. Now it’s 
recorded and it’s even posted the file as it goes along, and it’s 
systematic” [Nurse, Case 1]. 
The staff attendance book was implemented to provide 
information on the first and last name, qualification, arrival 
and departure time, and signature of the health worker. At 
first this register was filled in regularly. But after 3 months 
without the completion of any verification or the payment 
of any bonus, the vast majority of health workers only 
occasionally filled the attendance book, thereby questioning 
the project’s credibility:
“But after ... 3 months, no bonus, people started asking 
questions, is that [project] serious?” [PBF Focal Point, 
Case 2].
Discussion 
Our study is the first independent study on the 
implementation of PBF in Mali; and one of the few studies in 
Africa on the implementation of PBF at the DH level. To our 
knowledge, it is the only PBF study in French-speaking West 
Africa that focuses on the DH context. Our analysis of the 
implementation of PBF at DH level in Mali revealed several 
challenges related to the design and implementation of the 
intervention. Respondents adhered to the principle of PBF 
intervention, yet they felt it did not bring anything new. The 
study raised several constraints that may have hindered the 
implementation of PBF within DH. At the political level, the 
decisions made by national actors, mindful of the limitations 
of the PBF pilot project, had a considerable influence. The 
PBF intervention was one of the sub-components of a larger 
programme – the SRHP, which aimed to increase the use of 
reproductive health services in Mali. Despite the fact that 
decision-makers and the implementing agency at the central 
level knew that the design of the pilot project was inadequate, 
and despite the short time for implementation; they insisted 
on going ahead with the intervention so as not to lose World 
Bank funding. 
This further illustrates the fact that, in some instances, 
decisions to implement PBF pilot projects in low- and middle-
income countries depend on donors and the availability of 
funding, rather than national actors. The results of several 
studies highlight that there is a lack of ownership of PBF pilot 
projects by national actors in Africa.7,29,30,31 This absence is 
possibly due to the pilot form, which involves temporal and 
geographical constraints and external funding, portraying 
PBF as a vertical type intervention while being presented 
as a levee for health system reform.32 The lack of national 
ownership is, therefore, not specific to PBF; it is a recurring 
problem in Africa for any large intervention encouraged by 
international donors.33 
In addition, our analysis of PBF implementation in Mali 
highlighted specific problems in terms of ownership by 
decentralised-level actors (DRS and MCD), especially in terms 
of project design. They were not involved in the process of 
choosing performance indicators that mobilise subsidies. The 
choice of indicators matched the donors’ priorities, although 
they were certainly discussed and validated by the national 
authorities. Our results are similar to those of other studies 
in Benin and Rwanda29,34 which showed that the indicators 
chosen during the implementation of PBF in Africa often met 
donors’ priorities. 
At the macro-organisational level, the lack of participation 
of some health workers in the DH in the definition of the 
results plans, and the lack of information on the functioning 
of PBF caused significant problems in terms of health workers’ 
commitment. The introduction of new tools had positive 
effects on patient notification. The ratio between the number 
of indicators selected only in maternal and child health, and 
the number of health workers in a DH (about 50) seemed 
insufficient to involve all staff. Some people estimate that at 
least 15 to 20 quantitative indicators in health facilities are 
needed when implementing PBF, otherwise the focus would 
be on some services to the detriment of others.1 The choices 
made in Mali thus differed significantly from standards about 
PBF project design. 
The results plans were made during the first training 
session. The vast majority of DH agents did not participate 
Zitti et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(10), 583–592590
in defining the objectives of such plans. Thus, it would be 
difficult for DHs to achieve the performance objectives set in 
the results plans that had not been defined by the majority 
health workers. Defining the objectives of the results plans 
would benefit from a participatory process. A similar hasty 
selection of the objectives of results plans was observed in 
Uganda.11
As several other studies illustrated,11,12,13,35,36 health workers’ 
lack of information and knowledge of PBF led to their low 
commitment in implementation. Conversely, given their strong 
involvement in the smooth running of PBF, DHMT members 
had a better understanding of the intervention. Several other 
studies showed unequal knowledge of PBF between the main 
actors and the remaining of the workforce.12,36 Other studies 
indicated that involvement in the design and information 
of all local actors were key to the success of PBF, as these 
factors determine their commitment to reform.1,11,29,36 Finally, 
the new tools and methods of remuneration introduced 
by the PBF programme appeared to yield mixed results. 
Our qualitative data indicates that there was insufficient 
focus on the governance and financial management of 
DHs. Financial mismanagement of DHs reportedly caused 
distrust of health workers over fairness in allocating PBF 
bonus payments. Several studies highlighted health workers’ 
feeling of unfairness as to the ways PBF bonus payments were 
distributed.29,37 With respect to the new tools introduced 
by PBF, systematic feedback sheets helped to improve the 
evacuation reference system. The same observation was made 
in a study in Rwanda.35 
At the micro-organisational level, when PBF was 
implemented, most health workers expressed enthusiasm. The 
same enthusiasm and positive effect of the arrival of PBF on 
health workers has been observed in several other studies in 
Benin, Burkina Faso, and Malawi.16,29,36 However, local actors’ 
enthusiasm is not the only ingredient for project success. 
Since the PBF is a complex intervention in an already complex 
and highly hierarchical health system, the leadership of DH 
managers emerged as a determining factor in the success or 
otherwise of the PBF intervention. The lack of engagement of 
MCDs in some DHs caused recurring delays and malfunctions 
during the implementation of PBF. When implementing PBF, 
the leadership capacity of DHs’ managers was considered a 
factor influencing the implementation of the PBF in DHs. 
Several other studies in Benin, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone14,38,39 
confirmed this statement. Indeed, their own understanding of 
the intervention and their commitment play a key role in the 
implementation. These are the main actors that can influence 
the motivation of health workers. 
Our research has several limitations. First, the CFIR 
analysis framework with its different taxonomies, dimensions, 
and constructs enabled to identify all the contours of the 
implementation of the PBF project. However, during the 
analysis of the results, integrating of themes that emerged 
inductively proved to be complex. During the analysis, 
some constructs and sub-constructs of different dimensions 
provided information on the same contents (for example: 
the sub construct Relative Advantage of the dimension 
Intervention Characteristic and the sub-built Implementation 
Climate/Relative Priority of the Inner Setting dimension).
The second limitation of the CFIR is that it does not allow for 
accounting for the complexity and dynamics of interventions, 
because the constructs used are very descriptive and 
systematic, but somewhat too linear. The results of the study 
allowed us to spot some expected and unexpected effects of 
the PBF intervention in DHs. We highlight some of the most 
salient effects — as perceived by informants and effectively 
observed by the first author of this manuscript — in Table 
3. A specific qualitative study on the effects of PBF in DHs 
is necessary to specify the preliminary effects we observed 
during our study.
The CFIR is not designed to establish the correlation/
causality links (between implantation components/processes/
internal and external context on the one hand; and effects on 
the other hand). The study of the causal links between the 
contextual factors of the PBF pilot project and the effects of 
this project would merit a full and specific study. A theoretical 
framework that would be adapted to this type of study is the 
contribution analysis method by Mayne.40
Three additional limitations can be drawn from our study. 
Data collection took place when most DHs had only started 
PBF for 3 or 4 months. Therefore, apart from the main actors 
implementing PBF in DHs, other actors’ discourse and 
perceptions about the intervention were limited. Furthermore, 
patients have not been included in the interviewed persons. 
Lastly, our study is cross-sectional: it does not allow us 
to draw a conclusion on the evolution of the process of 
Table 3. Expected and Unintended Effects of the PBF Pilot Project in DHs
Expected Effects Unexpected Effects
•	 Establishment of results plans in DHs
•	 Increase in patient notification of patients attended to in DHs
•	 The implementation of the PBF pilot scheme addressed some of the 
malfunctions of the management bodies
•	 The systematic use of feedback sheets improved the evacuation-
reference system
•	 The establishment of new support tools (attendance book, register, 
feedback sheets in the evacuation-reference system) made it possible to 
strengthen the health system
•	 The introduction of the attendance book at the beginning of PBF 
implementation in DHs allowed health workers to be more timely,
•	 Hygiene in DHs improved
•	 The low number of PBF quantity indicators did not allow all 
stakeholders to be involved in the intervention
•	 The delay in verification and evaluation within DHs may have 
discouraged health workers
•	 As a consequence of the delay in verifying and paying 
premiums, health workers no longer filled in the attendance 
register correctly as they had done at the beginning of the PBF 
intervention
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; DHs, district hospitals.
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implementing PBF at DH level. Nevertheless, our study 
enabled us to review the quality of the PBF intervention 
model, the implementation process, the ownership of PBF 
at the DH level, and to identify lessons learned and areas of 
improvement in DHs. Further longitudinal research may 
allow for a more robust study of the process of implementing 
PBF at the DH level. It will also support other health reforms 
that can be implemented.
Conclusion
Our qualitative research at the DH level in Mali allowed 
us to highlight local actors’ representations of PBF, and 
to understand how the context and the norms and values 
influence its implementation. The PBF project offered an 
opportunity to improve the quality of care provided to the 
population through the motivation of health personnel in Mali. 
Respondents adhered to the principles of PBF but argued that 
it brought nothing new. Several challenges that could hinder 
the successful implementation of PBF within DHs were raised. 
We offer some recommendations to improve implementation. 
First of all, in order to mitigate the information problems with 
PBF, it would be useful to have effective communication at 
the start of the project to allow a better local appropriation. 
Secondly, the number of quantitative indicators chosen 
should be sufficient to allow all actors to be involved in project 
implementation. Finally, the logistical and financial resources 
should be made available to the DHMT members so that the 
quantitative and qualitative verifications are carried out on 
time. From its conception and during the implementation of 
PBF in DHs, it is necessary to consider the factors that can 
influence the implementation of such a complex intervention. 
Future qualitative studies are needed to understand how PBF 
affects the leadership and management of managers in DHs, 
and how PBF affects the involvement of DHMTs’ members in 
the supervision of the centres of health at the peripheral level 
during implementation. Studies on the distribution of bonus 
payments in DHs and how it affects the motivation of health 
workers are also needed.
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